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Reputational concerns, not altruism,
motivate restraint when gambling
with other people’s money
Kodi B. Arfer *, Michael T. Bixter and Christian C. Luhmann
Psychology Department, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA
People may behave prosocially not only because they value the welfare of others, but
also to protect their own reputation. We examined the separate roles of altruism and
reputational concerns in moral-hazard gambling tasks, which allowed subjects to gamble
with a partner’s money. In Study 1, subjects who were told that their partner would see
their choices were more prosocial. In Study 2, subjects were more prosocial to a single
partner when their choices were transparent than when their choices were attributed
to a third party. We conclude that reputational concerns are a key restraint on selfish
exploitation under moral hazard.
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1. Introduction
Nature is rich with social dilemmas, in which individuals must trade off between maximizing
benefits to themselves and to others (Rand and Nowak, 2013). For example, the more a person
donates to charity, the more others benefit and the less the donor has for herself. In fact, prosocial
behavior of many kinds is surprisingly common (for reviews, see Sally, 1995; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003). Why might people behave prosocially? One possible cause is a motivation to benefit others
even at a cost to oneself, which we will call altruism (more precisely, “psychological altruism”;
Wilson, 1992). Such altruism can be motivated by mental phenomena such as empathy (Batson,
1991), collectivism (Dawes et al., 1990), and inclusion of others in the self-concept (Cialdini et al.,
1997). Counterintuitively, direct motivation to help others at one’s own expense in this fashion may
be evolutionarily adaptive (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). On the other hand, people may behave
prosocially without altruism, that is, without such direct motivation. Populations can evolve a
variety of means to force cooperation from selfish agents (Rand and Nowak, 2013). In human
society, one such means is the law: the threat of imprisonment makes certain selfish behavior,
such as theft, costly. A person with purely selfish motivation may still abstain from theft, appearing
altruistic, purely to avoid this punishment. Thus, given any prosocial choice a person has made, it is
ambiguous howmuch the choice was motivated by altruism and howmuch by shrewd self-interest.
1.1. Reputational Concerns
It has been argued that improving one’s reputation is a particularly important way that prosocial
behavior can ultimately serve self-interest (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Experimental work is
consistent with this view. For example, Sylwester and Roberts (2010) had subjects play two rounds
of an economic game. Subjects who were more generous in the first round were chosen by partners
who were more generous in the second round. By this means, subjects who were more generous
initially earned more overall. Sylwester and Roberts reasoned that more generous subjects had
invested in their reputation.
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Bereczkei et al. (2007) attempted to distinguish the direct
effect of reputational concerns on generosity from altruistic
motives. Students were asked in the presence of their classmates
to volunteer for charities. When commitments to volunteer
were made publicly, so that classmates could observe them, the
proportion of subjects who volunteered jumped from 25 to 50%.
Thus, Bereczkei et al. inferred that the observed difference in
generosity was due to reputational concerns. Similar findings
of audience-dependent generosity have been obtained by other
investigators, particularly among subjects who are especially self-
interested (“egoistic”; Simpson and Willer, 2008) or socially
manipulative (“Machiavellian”; Bereczkei et al., 2010).
There is also evidence that people will take opportunities to
appear prosocial without actually being so. In the ultimatum
games of Kagel et al. (1996), subjects who knew their own payoff
from a deal would be tripled but who knew their opponent
did not know this typically offered an even split. Thus, subjects
behaved in a way that appeared fair (perhaps to increase the
odds the opponent would accept the split) but was actually self-
interested. In the dictator games of Dana et al. (2007), subjects
were more likely to choose a selfish split when the opponent
did not know the payoffs. Hence, subjects acted less prosocially
when their opponents could not evaluate how prosocial they
were being. However, these findings are difficult to interpret with
respect to reputation management, because in both studies, it
is not clear that subjects could identify each other, and thus,
reputational consequences were not clearly involved.
1.2. Moral Hazard
In the bulk of the experimental tasks described above, there was
no uncertainty other than subjects’ ignorance of other people’s
thoughts and plans. Real-life social dilemmas, on the other
hand, are often uncertain. Taking advantage of other parties
may or may not ultimately harm them. One class of social
dilemma which captures this kind of risk is moral hazard (more
precisely, “indirect moral hazard,” Crosby, 1905, or “morale
hazard,” McLeman and Smit, 2006). A person is said to be
under moral hazard when potential negative consequences of her
decisions will be borne by a third party, regardless of whether
the situation would be seen as morally charged according to
psychological or philosophical notions of morality. Moral hazard
has primarily been studied in the context of insurance (e.g.,
Grossman, 1992; Quiggin et al., 1993; Abraham et al., 2010). The
provision of insurance shifts losses from an individual to her
insurance agency, increasing her incentives for risk-taking and
therefore possibly making her less sensitive to risk. For example,
people who are insured against floods are under moral hazard
because they face less potential loss by purchasing property in a
flood-prone area (e.g., Burby, 2001; Huber, 2004; Bagstad et al.,
2007). However, moral hazard also arises in everyday situations.
A person may be less careful to lock her friend’s door than her
own, because she does not experience the negative consequences
of a robbery. Similarly, an HIV-positive person having sex with
an HIV-negative partner has less to lose by neglecting to use
a condom. More broadly, moral hazard is related to other
means of exploiting the contributions of others, such as social
loafing (Karau and Williams, 1993), as well as to differences in
risk-taking between individuals and groups (Zajonc et al., 1969;
Burnstein et al., 1973; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005).
Recently, we (Bixter and Luhmann, 2014) experimentally
demonstrated increased risk-taking under moral hazard. Subjects
were asked to choose between a mixed gamble (e.g., a 70% chance
of gaining $40 and a 30% chance of losing $40) and a sure gain
(e.g., $15). Each trial had a different gamble; gambles came in
various types. For standard gambles, subjects had to bear the
full loss themselves if they chose the mixed gamble and lost.
For shared gambles, half of any loss (e.g., $20 of the $40) would
be borne by a third party, the subject’s partner. Thus, shared
gambles were more beneficial to the subject, but more harmful
to the partner, than standard gambles. As in any moral-hazard
situation, taking a shared gamble, compared to an equivalent
standard gamble, meant reducing one’s own potential loss by
an amount equal to the potential loss inflicted upon someone
else. This situation is similar to a dictator game, where one
can increase one’s own gain by reducing another person’s gain
by the same amount (Forsythe et al., 1994). Altruistic subjects,
by refraining from shared gambles, could thus benefit their
partner (by protecting her from loss) while forgoing extra gain to
themselves. Other trials in Bixter and Luhmann (2014) involved
matched gambles, which involved the same loss to the subject as
the corresponding shared gamble (e.g., a 70% chance of gaining
$40 and a 30% chance of losing $20) but no loss to the partner.
A subject entirely insensitive to her partner’s welfare should then
treat matched gambles identically to shared gambles. The results
of the study indicated that subjects were more likely to take
shared gambles and matched gambles than standard gambles; in
fact, no significant difference was found between the former two.
That is, subjects’ behavior was consistent with a total disregard
for the welfare of others.
In the second experiment presented in Bixter and Luhmann
(2014), we tried to increase subjects’ prosocial behavior by
decreasing the social distance between subject and partner—that
is, by making subjects feel personally closer to their partner.
Previous research (e.g., Jones and Rachlin, 2006) had found that
people are more generous toward others to whom they feel
closer. Though there was a suggestion that shared gambles were
less attractive than matched gambles, this difference was not
significant. Overall, the results were similar to that of the first
experiment.
The present studies are another attempt to induce prosocial
behavior in this kind of moral-hazard gambling task. We
investigated if reputational concerns can reduce subjects’
willingness to take shared gambles.
2. Study 1
Study 1 was a two-condition between-subjects experiment. In
the Visible condition, we made reputational concerns salient by
telling subjects that their partner would see what choices they
had made, and how they had affected the partner’s welfare. In
the Anonymous condition, we told subjects that their choices
would be kept secret from the partner. We expected subjects in
the Visible condition to be less willing to take advantage of the
partner under moral hazard.
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2.1. Method
For both Study 1 and Study 2, our research protocol was approved
by the Committees on Research Involving Human Subjects of
Stony Brook University’s Office of Research Compliance, and all
subjects provided informed consent.
2.1.1. Subjects
Subjects were 38 undergraduates at Stony Brook University run
in pairs. There were 19 subjects in each of the Anonymous
and Visible experimental conditions (which were assigned at
random per subject without regard to dyads). All subjects were
native speakers of English. There were 5 female–female dyads, 14
opposite-gender dyads, and no male–male dyads. See Table 1 for
additional demographic characteristics. Subjects received partial
course credit and $5 for participation.
2.1.2. Gambling Task
The gambling task was an adaption of themoral-hazard gambling
task discussed earlier (Bixter and Luhmann, 2014). Subjects
gambled with hypothetical money, but were instructed that
they would receive $5 in real money if their total earnings
reached a certain unspecified threshold. Such an incentive
scheme, following Bixter and Luhmann (2014), implied that
every trial was in some sense realized (subjects could not be
assured that only one of their decisions would end up affecting
their and their partner’s welfare) but also that subjects’ choices
could not be affected by how much they had earned mid-task,
because they did not know the threshold. In fact, we paid the
$5 to every subject, so the threshold was an arbitrarily low
number.
On each trial, the subject chose between a sure gain of $15,
presented at the top of the computer screen, and a mixed gamble,
presented at the bottom, by pressing an arrow key. The subject
was instructed that for some, specially indicated gambles, any
losses would be shared with her partner, another subject she had
seen earlier. Subjects were informed that they were not vulnerable
to sustaining losses from their partner’s decisions.
All gambles had two outcomes, winning and losing. There
were three types of gambles (see Figure 1, upper row; catch
gambles appear similarly to standard gambles and hence are not
shown).
• For standard gambles, the probability of winning was 50, 60,
70, or 80%, and the amount to be won or lost was $20, $30,
$40, $50, or $60.
• Shared gambles were like standard gambles except if the
subject took the gamble and lost, half the loss amount was
ostensibly inflicted on the partner instead of the subject. Thus,
shared gambles entailed moral hazard.
• Catch gambles were like standard gambles, but the amount
to be won or lost was $10. Thus, the sure gain of $15 strictly
dominated all catch gambles. Selection of a catch gamble was
taken as evidence of thoughtless responding.
Subjects were offered every combination of probability, amount,
and gamble type twice (except that catch gambles were presented
only once each). This arrangement yielded a total of 84 trials,
which were presented in a random order. When a gamble was
TABLE 1 | Frequency tables of demographic characteristics for the
subjects in Study 1, grouped by experimental condition.
Anonymous Visible
Sample size 17 17
Gender
Female 10 11
Male 7 6
Age
18 10 6
19 3 0
20 3 4
21 0 2
22 1 3
23 0 1
27 0 1
Year in college
1st 11 6
2nd 2 0
3rd 4 5
4th 0 4
5th or above 0 1
No response 0 1
Race and ethnicity
Asian 4 4
Black 1 1
Native American 1 0
White 9 8
White and Hispanic 1 2
Multiracial 0 1
Multiracial and Hispanic 0 1
Other 1 0
Is bilingual
No 13 13
Yes 4 4
Sexual orientation
Heterosexual 14 15
Homosexual 1 0
Bisexual 1 1
No response 1 1
Dominant hand
Left 2 1
Right 15 16
Has normal visual acuity
No 2 0
Yes 15 17
selected, the outcome (whether the subject won or lost) was not
shown during the task, because we did not want outcomes to
influence subsequent choices.
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FIGURE 1 | Sample trials, as they were displayed to subjects. A
reminder of player assignments always appeared at the top of the screen.
Upper row: Trials from Study 1. On the left is a standard gamble, and on the
right is a shared gamble. Lower row: Trials from Study 2. On the left is a
standard gamble; matched gambles appeared the same, except with the
loss amount halved. In the center is a local shared gamble; remote shared
gambles appeared the same, except reading “Shared Loss with Player B.”
On the right is a deceit gamble.
2.1.3. Procedure
The experimenter met both subjects of each dyad together and
explained the gambling task orally and with a handout. (See
Appendix A in Supplementary Material for the full text of the
handout.) Subjects were told the task had two roles, Player A
and Player B. Player B would be offered shared gambles (which
they could take to benefit themselves at the chance of causing loss
to Player A), whereas Player A would not be offered any shared
gambles. Thus, Player B could causes losses to Player A, but not
vice versa. Subjects were told they would be randomly assigned
to roles. In reality, all subjects were assigned to the role of Player
B. We used this deception (and a similar one in Study 2) because
our interest was in the behavior of the most powerful player, so
having real subjects take on less powerful roles would have wasted
subjects.
After this meeting with the experimenter, the two subjects of
each dyad went to adjacent private rooms to complete the task
on computers. The computer told each subject that they were
Player B and then displayed a message depending on a randomly
assigned experimental condition. In the Anonymous condition,
the message was “Your partner will not be told what choices you
made or whether you affected their chances of winning $5.” In
the Visible condition, themessage was “After the task is complete,
your partner will see a complete list of the choices you made and
how you affected their chances of winning $5. The two of you will
then have the opportunity to discuss your choices.” This message
was the only manipulation that depended on condition.
After subjects completed the gambling trials, their total
earnings from the gambling task were displayed, and they were
paid $5 of real money. (This $5 was the same $5 mentioned
above as compensation.) The behavior of subjects in the Visible
condition was not actually shown to other subjects. We think it
would have been unethical to do so, since showing a subject the
shared gambles taken by her partner could be upsetting to both
subjects, and we had no plan to collect useful data from such an
exchange.
2.2. Results and Discussion
See http://arfer.net/projects/hazard for raw data, task code, and
analysis code for both Study 1 and Study 2.
Four subjects accepted 2 or more catch gambles. These
subjects were excluded from further analysis, as were all catch
trials. The remaining sample was also evenly split by condition,
with 17 subjects in each.
Overall, Anonymous subjects took 28% of standard gambles
and 41% of shared gambles, whereas Visible subjects took 36% of
standard gambles and 35% of shared gambles. See Figure 2 for a
complete breakdown of choices collapsed across subjects.
We analyzed the effects of gamble type and experimental
condition on gambling behavior with Bayesian mixed-effects
logistic regression. We chose regression over ANOVA or t-
tests to avoid treating numerical predictors, such as gamble
probability, as categorical, and we chose logistic regression over
linear regression because our dependent variable, whether the
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FIGURE 2 | The number of gambles taken in Study 1 by condition, gamble type, gain amount, and win probability. Since each gamble was offered twice,
each subject may contribute up to two units to each bar.
subject took the gamble, was dichotomous. We used Bayesian
methods rather than null-hypothesis significance testing chiefly
so that we could describe precisely what could be inferred
about model parameters, properly accounting for all sources of
uncertainty tracked by the model. Doing Bayesian data analysis is
also consistent with growing dissatisfaction with standard uses of
significance testing (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Gelman and Stern, 2006;
Kruschke, 2010; Wagenmakers et al., 2011; Cumming, 2014).
For the dependent variable, we coded taking the gamble as
1 and taking the sure gain of $15 as 0. The model had a single
per-subject random effect drawn from a normal distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation σ , where the hyperparameter
σ was given a prior density uniform on [1/10, 100]. Fixed
effects are listed in Table 2. All fixed effects were assigned
improper uniform priors. Notice that the model does not include
parameters for loss (or expected value). This means that the
values of b_g_shared_anon and b_g_shared_visible
will include the effect of reduced loss to the subject as well as
increased loss to the partner, so our analyses will not answer the
question of whether subjects would make prosocial choices at no
cost to themselves. (The effect of reduced loss alone is examined
with matched gambles in Study 2.)
TABLE 2 | Fixed effects of the regression model in Study 1.
Parameter Predictor
PARAMETERS OF INTEREST
b_g_shared_anon Whether this gamble is shared and the subject
is Anonymous
b_g_shared_visible Whether this gamble is shared and the subject
is Visible
NUISANCE PARAMETERS
b0 None (constant term)
b_g_egain Product of win probability and gain amount
b_female Whether the subject is female
b_local_female Whether the local partner is female
Model parameters were estimated with the Markov chain
Monte Carlo sampler Stan (http://mc-stan.org). Markov chain
Monte Carlo is a numerical method for estimating the parameters
of a Bayesian model. In accordance with the recommendations of
Gelman et al. (2004), eight chains were run with random initial
values, and for each chain, 250 adaptive burn-in iterations were
discarded and 250 non-adaptive sampling iterations were kept,
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for a total of 2000 samples per parameter. This resulted in a
Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992) of less than
1.05 for all parameters.
Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 3. With
posterior samples in hand, to answer the question of how
the experimental condition affected subjects’ willingness
to take shared gambles, we computed the posterior
probability that b_g_shared_anon is greater than
b_g_shared_visible. This inequality was satisfied by
every sample, so the posterior probability that it is true exceeds
99%. We conclude that subjects were indeed less willing to
take shared gambles, exposing their partner to risk, when their
reputation was at stake. In fact, in the Visible condition, it is
more likely than not that subjects preferred standard gambles
to shared gambles (specifically, the posterior probability of
b_g_shared_visible being less than 0 is 68%), despite
how a standard gamble has twice the potential loss to the
subject as a shared gamble, suggesting subjects preferred
increased monetary losses to themselves over reputational
fallout.
3. Study 2
In Study 1, we found that reputational concerns can induce
restraint of risk-taking under moral hazard. Specifically, telling
subjects that their partner would be able to confront them about
how they had gambled with the partner’s money reduced such
gambling. Study 2 used a more complex task, with two partners,
FIGURE 3 | Posterior means and 95% equal-tailed credible intervals for
the effect of each gamble type in Study 1. The y-axis is in logit units, so a
value of 1 implies a 2.7-fold increase in the odds of taking a gamble.
to examine how reputation effects interact with social-distance
effects.
In Study 2, there was no between-subjects manipulation, but
we offered subjects shared gambles with two partners. The local
partner, as in Study 1, was another subject. Since Bixter and
Luhmann (2014) seemed to have failed to decrease social distance
enough to make subjects choose more prosocially, we used a
stronger manipulation of social distance: we introduced subjects
to each other and attempted to establish rapport. The remote
partner, by contrast, was an unseen and unnamed person. As in
the Visible condition of study 1, subjects were told their partners
would be able to see what losses they had incurred from the
subject’s actions.
We included three kinds of shared gambles: local shared
gambles (which shared losses with the local partner), remote
shared gambles (which shared losses with the remote partner),
and deceit gambles (which shared losses with the local partner
while protecting the subject’s reputation). If subjects were
genuinely altruistic toward the local partner (i.e., cared about the
local partner’s welfare), they should have found deceit gambles
no more attractive than local shared gambles, since both expose
the same partner to loss. Subjects behaving prosocially out of
reputational concerns alone, on the other hand, should have
found deceit gambles more attractive than local shared gambles,
because deceit gambles allow subjects to benefit from shared
gambles without suffering reputational fallout.
Finally, Study 2 also included matched gambles, as in Bixter
and Luhmann (2014). Matched gambles were like standard
gambles but with the loss amount halved, so that the potential loss
to the subject from taking amatched gamble was the same as from
taking a shared gamble. (The potential gain, and the probabilities
of gain and loss, were the same between matched and shared
gambles as well, but these were equal among all gamble types.
Together, these facts imply that a matched gamble had not just
the same expected value for the subject as a shared gamble, but
the identical probability distribution of outcomes for the subject.)
Thus, subjects who were entirely indifferent to the welfare of their
partners should have treatedmatched gambles the same as shared
gambles.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects
Subjects were 34 undergraduates at Stony Brook University run
in pairs. All subjects were native speakers of English. There were 4
male–male dyads, 4 female–female dyads, and 9 opposite-gender
dyads. Ages ranged from 18 to 26. Subjects received partial course
credit and $5 for participation.
3.1.2. Tasks
3.1.2.1. Relationship closeness induction task
Dyads completed a form of the Relationship Closeness Induction
Task (RCIT; Sedikides et al., 1999). The RCIT is similar to
the method of inducing interpersonal closeness described by
Aron et al. (1997), but much shorter. Subjects were given
lists of questions to ask each other and answer. Questions
become progressively more intimate over the course of the task,
ranging from “Where are you from?” to “What would be the
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perfect lifestyle for you?” to “What’s your most frightening early
memory?.” Subjects were allowed to finish all the questions at
their own pace. The task took 10–15 min per dyad.
3.1.2.2. Gambling task
In Study 2, unlike Study 1, subjects were told there were two
partners: the “local partner,” the subject’s dyadic counterpart, and
the “remote partner,” an unseen and unnamed other person at
another university. In reality, the remote partner did not exist.
Whereas Study 1 offered one type of shared gamble, Study 2
offered three (see Figure 1, lower row). All ostensibly inflicted
half the loss amount on a third party. Which third party was
exposed to loss depended on the gamble type.
• Local shared gambles exposed the local partner to loss.
• Remote shared gambles exposed the remote partner to loss.
• Deceit gambles exposed the local partner to loss (like local
shared gambles); however, any loss sustained by the local
partner would be attributed to the actions of the remote
partner rather than the subject.
Study 2 also had an additional gamble type, the matched gamble.
Matched gambles were like standard gambles but with the loss
amount halved. Thus, subjects who were entirely indifferent to
the welfare of their partners should have treatedmatched gambles
the same as shared gambles.
In summary, Study 2 had six types of gambles: standard, catch,
matched, local shared, remote shared, and deceit shared. This
assortment differed from what was offered in Study 1 in the
addition of matched gambles and in the replacement of the one
kind of shared gamble with three kinds of shared gambles.
Subjects were offered every combination of probability,
amount, and gamble type (only once), for a total 104 trials.
3.1.2.3. Distance-ranking task
Since we expected that interpersonal closeness would influence
prosocial behavior, we had subjects rank 12 people, including
their two partners, in order of social distance. First, subjects were
asked to think of a particular instance of, and provide a nickname
for, each of several types of people: “Your best friend,” “The
parent or stepparent you’re closest to,” “A friend of a friend,” “A
childhood friend you haven’t spoken to in years,” “A relative you
see no more than a few times a year,” “Your primary physician,”
“A cashier at a store (or a university eatery) that you go to often,”
“A classmate you can recognize but you’ve never spoken to,” “A
relative who you know a least a little about but who died before
you were born,” and “A stranger you’ve seen once or a few times
and who you know nothing about,” as well as the local and remote
partners. Then subjects were shown a list of just their provided
nicknames and asked to “sort these people according to how close
you feel to them.” We coded the closest person as 1 and the
furthest as 12.
3.1.3. Procedure
First, subjects completed the RCIT, which was described as a
new communication task. Then the experimenter explained the
gambling task orally and with a handout. (See Appendix B in
Supplementary Material for the full text of the handout.) Subjects
were told the task had three roles, Player A, Player B, and Player
C, who differed in the shared gambles they would be offered.
Player A would see no shared gambles, Player B could share losses
with Player A but not Player C, and Player C could share losses
with Players A and B. Subjects were told they would be randomly
assigned to roles. In reality, all subjects were assigned to the role
of Player C, and were told upon seeing their own assignment that
that the remote partner (labeled “Participant at SUNY Buffalo”;
see Figure 1) would be Player B and the local partner (labeled
“Your partner”) would be Player A.
Only when subjects began the task in adjacent private rooms
was the existence of deceit gambles revealed, because we did
not want subjects to think that their local partner knew deceit
gambles existed and thus would not be entirely deceived.
After subjects completed the gambling task, they performed
the distance-ranking task. Finally, their total earnings from the
gambling task were displayed, and they were paid $5 of real
money.
3.2. Results and Discussion
Two subjects accepted 2 or more catch gambles. These subjects
were excluded from further analysis, as were all catch trials.
Overall, subjects took 28% of standard gambles, but 42% of
matched gambles, 41% of local shared gambles, 46% of remote
shared gambles, and 48% of deceit gambles. See Figure 4 for a
complete breakdown of choices collapsed across subjects.
The median difference between social-distance ranks of the
local and remote partners was 3, with the local partner ranked
closer. This difference, being on a 12-point scale, was smaller than
might have been expected; however, the rated social distance of
the remote partner appeared to suffer from a strong ceiling effect,
with 84% of subjects selecting ranks 10, 11, or 12.
We analyzed the effects of gamble type and rated social
distance on gambling behavior with a Bayesian mixed-effects
logistic regression, as in Study 1. The fixed effects for the Study
2 model are shown in Table 3. Since social-distance rank of the
remote partner appeared limited by a ceiling effect, this variable
was not included as a predictor. We generated posterior samples
as in Study 1.
3.2.1. Effect of Gamble Types
First, we expected all four gamble-type parameters—
b_g_matched, b_g_shared_local, b_g_shared_
remote, and b_g_shared_deceit—to exceed zero,
indicating that subjects were more likely to take matched
or shared gambles than standard gambles. We also
examined whether b_g_shared_deceit was greater
than b_g_shared_local, which would indicate that subjects
were more willing to cause loss to the local partner when
their reputation was not at stake. Finally, we checked that
b_g_shared_remote exceeded b_g_shared_local, in
accordance with greater social distance leading to decreases in
prosocial choices.
Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 5. We assessed the
effects of the various gamble types by comparing the values
of the corresponding parameters. As can be seen in Table 4,
the posterior probability of each parameter being greater than
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FIGURE 4 | The number of gambles taken in Study 2 by gamble type, gain amount, and win probability.
TABLE 3 | Fixed effects of the regression model in Study 2.
Parameter Predictor
PARAMETERS OF INTEREST
b_g_matched Whether this gamble is a matched gamble
b_g_shared_local Whether this gamble is a local shared gamble
b_g_shared_remote Whether this gamble is a remote shared gamble
b_g_shared_deceit Whether this gamble is a deceit gamble
NUISANCE PARAMETERS
b0 None (constant term)
b_g_egain Product of win probability and gain amount
b_female Whether the subject is female
b_local_female Whether the local partner is female
b_both_female Whether both are female
b_local_distrank Social distance rank of the local partner
zero exceeded 99%, indicating that matched gambles and all
kinds of shared gambles were more appealing to subjects than
standard gambles. Critically, with probability exceeding 99%,
deceit gambles were more appealing than local shared gambles,
indicating subjects were more willing to expose local partners
to loss when disguised as a third party and thus protected
from reputational consequences. Furthermore, with probability
97%, remote shared gambles were more appealing than local
shared gambles, indicating that generosity decreased with social
distance.
Two other more counterintuitive results should also be
noted. First, deceit gambles (probability 99%) and remote shared
gambles (probability 91%) were more appealing than matched
gambles, although they did not afford subjects any additional
protection from loss. Possibly these kinds of shared gambles
had some appeal above and beyond their reduced potential loss.
Second, there was a suggestion (probability 78%) that deceit
gambles were preferred to remote gambles. Perhaps subjects’
concern for their reputation with the remote partner plus their
genuine interest in the remote partner’s welfare was greater than
their genuine interest in the local partner’s welfare. Genuine
interest for the local partner plus concern for reputation with the
local partner, however, may have made local shared gambles less
appealing than matched gambles (probability 70%).
4. General Discussion
We examined altruism, reputational concerns, and social
distance as causes of prosocial behavior. Subjects were offered a
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FIGURE 5 | Posterior means and 95% equal-tailed credible intervals for
the effect of each gamble type in Study 2. The y-axis is in logit units, so a
value of 1 implies a 2.7-fold increase in the odds of taking a gamble.
series of gambles, some of which allowed them to share any losses
with a partner. In Study 1, we found that making reputational
concerns salient made subjects take fewer gambles that would
expose their partner to loss. In Study 2, subjects were less willing
to openly expose a partner they had met to loss (by taking local
shared gambles) than a partner they hadn’t met (by taking remote
shared gambles). But when subjects could pseudonymously
expose the local partner to loss (by taking deceit gambles), this
apparent concern disappeared. In fact, subjects took more deceit
gambles than remote shared gambles. Therefore, the apparent
concern for the local partner’s welfare can be explained by
reputational concerns alone. Together, Studies 1 and 2 suggest
reputational concerns are a key motive for restraint of risk-taking
under moral hazard.
4.1. Social Distance
Our subjects’ greater willingness in Study 2 to take remote shared
gambles than local shared gambles is consistent with past work
on social distance. As the social distance between a subject
and a third party decreases, generosity increases (Jones and
Rachlin, 2006). Manipulations to decrease social distance that
have increased generosity in economic games include allowing
subjects to see each others’ faces (Bohnet and Frey, 1999) and
revealing last names (Charness and Gneezy, 2008). By contrast,
our earlier study using a similar moral-hazard paradigm (Bixter
and Luhmann, 2014) found no significant effect of whether
subjects had personally met their partner. Our strengthened
design, which involved an opportunity to become socially closer
to the local partner (the RCIT) and an especially distant remote
partner for contrast, found an effect of social distance that Bixter
TABLE 4 | Probabilities of inequalities between gamble-type parameters.
b_g_shared_ b_g_shared_ b_g_matched zero
remote local
b_g_shared_deceit 0.781 0.998 0.991 1.000
b_g_shared_remote 0.974 0.906 1.000
b_g_shared_local 0.298 1.000
b_g_matched 1.000
Each cell gives the probability that the row parameter is greater than the column
parameter.
and Luhmann (2014) did not. The importance of social distance
for economic decision-making is further suggested by its effects
on variables other than generosity. Ziegler and Tunney (2012),
for example, found that subjects made more patient choices on
the behalf of third parties the less genetically related the third
party was to the subject.
4.2. Additional Findings
We found that most kinds of shared gambles were preferred
to standard gambles. This is the basic moral-hazard effect of
people weighting losses to others less than losses to themselves,
replicating Bixter and Luhmann (2014). On the other hand,
Visible subjects in Study 1, for whom reputational concerns
were particularly salient, may have preferred standard gambles to
shared gambles, suggesting that a personal loss may be preferred
to facing blame for causing a loss to somebody else.
Our most surprising finding was subjects’ preference in
Study 2 for deceit gambles over matched gambles (and their
less likely preference for remote shared gambles over matched
gambles). Effectively, these shared losses were treated as gains.
Possible explanations include misery loving company (e.g.,
Cooper and Rege, 2011); a dissonance effect creating antipathy
toward partners (Glass, 1964); an antisocial desire to punish
the remote partner (Branas-Garza et al., 2014) by harming her
reputation, on the presumption that the remote partner has
taken shared gambles harming the local partner; or a view of
the deceit gambles as special opportunities that should be taken
advantage of.
4.3. Moral Hazard
There are various ways a person can behave prosocially toward
another party. A person can perform an action that incurs a
personal cost while simultaneously increasing the welfare of
the third party. The real-world action that best represents this
form of prosociality is charitable donation. However, people
can also behave prosocially toward another party by refraining
from committing an action that benefits themselves but decreases
the welfare of the third party. Moral hazard is a situation
that captures this latter scenario, because increased risk-taking
under moral hazard can lead to personal benefits while exposing
another party to losses that she is not directly responsible for.
Moral hazards are pervasive throughout the real world
and can lead to large societal costs (e.g., Blanchard-Boehm
et al., 2001; Okamoto, 2009). As a result, it is important
to gain a better understanding of the processes that affect
people’s decision making when they are under moral hazard.
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Furthermore, research in the laboratory has overwhelmingly
focused on the former class of prosocial behavior, such as
allotments in ultimatum and dictator games (Camerer and
Thaler, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996; Charness and Gneezy, 2008).
The experiments of Leliveld et al. (2009), however, suggest that
people care more about fairness and less about self-interest when
losses rather than gains are at stake, and Zhou and Wu (2011)
found a higher rate of altruistic punishment in ultimatum games
with losses than in ultimatum games with gains. Clearly, in order
to achieve a better understanding of the origins of prosociality,
it is necessary to study instances of prosocial behavior across
a variety of contexts and situations. The results of our studies
suggest that reputational concern is one available method to
increase prosocial behavior when a decision-maker is under
moral hazard.
4.4. Limitations
As just discussed, there are many kinds of situations to which
questions of altruism and prosocial behavior apply. Our studies
focused on moral hazard, which is only one such kind of
situation, and therefore they do not say much about altruism in
other situations. Furthermore, it is believable that people behave
differently in different contexts of moral hazard. For example,
perhaps people are less prosocial toward insurance agencies
than individuals, or perhaps people are more prosocial when
exploitation would endanger human health rather than finances.
Future research would need to examine such moderating effects
directly in order to discover their influence.
In our studies, subjects were placed in an implicit position of
power by being offered opportunities to exploit partners. Such
an opportunity is part of the definition of moral hazard, but our
task differed from most real-life moral-hazard situations in that
exploitation was presented as an explicit option. Thus, by a sort
of demand characteristic driven by the perceived legitimacy of
exploitation, subjects may have been more willing to take shared
gambles than they would been in an equivalent real-life situation.
Fortunately, any such demand characteristic would apply equally
to the two conditions of Study 1 and to all the kinds of shared
gambles in Study 2, meaning that the contrasts of chief interest
cannot have been affected.
Our studies used an unusual incentive scheme that paid
subjects real money if they had reached an unspecified threshold
of in-task earnings, as opposed to, for example, paying subjects in
direct proportion to in-task earnings, or choosing a random trial
to realize. This scheme has the advantage of making every trial
count without allowing subjects to exploit dependencies between
gambles or “play with the house’s money.” On the other hand,
it complicates comparison to other studies. Future research may
benefit from standardizing on compensation.
In Study 2, although we attempted to create social closeness
between subjects with the RCIT, and the distance-ranking task
confirmed that subjects generally saw the remote partner as more
distant than the local partner, subjects still did not feel very close
to the local partner. After all, a short in-lab exercise between
strangers cannot be expected to forge a social bond comparable
in magnitude to long-term friendships or romantic relationships.
As mentioned in the introduction, research on social discounting
(e.g., Jones and Rachlin, 2006) shows that people are willing to
make larger sacrifices to benefit a third party the closer they are
to the third party. Thus, our results leave open the possibility
that subjects will be more altruistic under moral hazard when
the third party whose resources they can gamble with is a true
intimate.
4.5. Self-interest vs. Prosocial Behavior
In previous studies, subjects could directly, materially gain from
maintaining a reputation (Kagel et al., 1996; Simpson andWiller,
2008; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010) or at least expected to
repeatedly interact with the audience in the future (Bereczkei
et al., 2007, 2010). In our studies, by contrast, the advantage
to maintaining a good reputation in the eyes of partners was
less clear, since subjects had no reason to believe they would
interact with their partners again. We suggest, then, that people
inherently value reputation.
We found that subjects were self-interested but not
transparently so. This observation is an example of how
prosocial behavior is not, in general, incompatible with the
notion that organisms are largely self-interested. On the
contrary, self-interest can be useful as an explanation for
prosocial behavior.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00848
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